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2022 MLB Lockout: Time to Re-Examine Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption
Adam Renfro*
INTRODUCTION
The 2022 Major League Baseball (MLB) season is currently in jeopardy of a
delayed start.1 On December 2, 2021, at 12:01 a.m. EST, the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between MLB and the Major League Baseball
Players’ Association (MLBPA) expired.2 In response, MLB owners
unanimously voted to institute a lockout, resulting in the ninth work
stoppage in the history of MLB, and the first since 1994.3 By failing to
agree to a new CBA, the relationship between MLB and the MLBPA has
once again become hostile and contentious.4 That the relationship between

* J.D. Candidate, May 2023, Saint Louis University School of Law
1 Tom Verducci, The Start of the MLB Regular Season Is in Jeopardy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Feb. 4, 2022), https://www.si.com/mlb/2022/02/04/mlb-lockout-start-of-regular-season-injeopardy.
2 James Wagner, With No Deadline Deal, M.L.B.’s Lockout Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/02/sports/baseball/mlb-lockout.html.
3 Id. The 1994 work stoppage was different from the current MLB work stoppage, as it
resulted from a players strike. While both result in a work stoppage, a strike is initiated
by the labor, in this case the players, while a lockout is initiated by the owners. Of the
nine work stoppages in the history of MLB, four have been due to a lockout, while the
other five resulted from a player’s strike. In addition to the current MLB lockout, the
other instances of a lockout occurred in 1973, 1976, and 1990. Prior to the current MLB
lockout, there was a work stoppage due to an MLB lockout in 1973, 1976, and 1990. In
addition to the 1994 strike, the MLB had a work stoppage resulting from a players strike
in 1972, 1980, 1981, and 1990.
4 See JOHN HEYLAR, THE LORDS OF THE REALM: THE REAL HISTORY OF BASEBALL (1994), for
an in-depth look at the relationship between owners and players and how it has changed
over the twentieth century. See also Genevieve F. Birren, A Brief History of Sports Labor
Stoppages: The Issues, The Labor Stoppages and Their Effectiveness (Or Lack Thereof), 10
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (2014). The failure to come to a new CBA,
and the lockout resulting from the failure to do so, is nothing new for baseball. Prior to
2002, baseball had a labor stoppage during every CBA negotiation except the very first
one. The 2002-2006 CBA was the first negotiated in over 30 years without a labor
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MLB and the MLBPA has been overwhelmingly contentious throughout
its history can largely be attributed to baseball’s infamous antitrust
exemption, which baseball has enjoyed since 1922.
It is pure happenstance, or perhaps, more accurately, poignant case of
irony, that the 2022 MLB season will also mark the 100-year anniversary of
baseball’s infamous antitrust exemption. The legal basis for baseball’s
exemption from antitrust laws stems from three Supreme Court cases,
which collectively are known as the “Baseball Trilogy.”5 This article will
discuss the questionable legal basis underlying the judicially created
exemption for baseball, focusing on the widespread misinterpretation of
the Court’s decision in 1922 in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
“Every other sport—like virtually every sort of business—is governed by
the antitrust laws.” 6
A.

The Sherman Antitrust Act

In 1890, Congress, pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause,
enacted the Sherman Act with the intent of preventing unreasonable
restraints on trade and promoting competition and free market
principles.7 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "contracts,
stoppage. The 2007-2011, 2012-2016, and 2017-2021 CBAs were also reached without any
stoppage.
5 The "Baseball Trilogy" is comprised of three Supreme Court decisions that effectively
constructed MLB's antitrust exemption: Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of
Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953); and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
6 STUART BANNER, THE BASEBALL TRUST: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
xi (2013).
7 The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Feb. 9, 2022). See also N. Pac Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was designed to be a
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combinations ... and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States ...”8 Section 2 of the Act prohibits monopolization of any
"part of the trade or commerce among the several States."9 The Sherman
Act applies only to agreements or activities that have a substantial impact
on or occur in the flow of interstate commerce.10
B.

The Baseball Trilogy

Remarkably, the baseball antitrust exemption that is still effective today
did not arise from a policy decision on behalf of the legislative or
executive branch. Rather, the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs
established the framework of baseball’s antitrust exemption.11 However,
despite a century’s worth of judicial deference to the Court’s decision in
Federal Baseball, the decision by the Court did not exempt baseball from
the antitrust laws but instead simply held that baseball is not governed by
the Sherman Act because it is not a form of interstate commerce. In other
words, the Court determined that Congress was unable to apply the
antitrust laws to baseball because it fell outside of their powers granted to
them by the Commerce Clause. The Court’s decision in Federal Baseball has
been widely condemned and labeled as an “aberration that makes little
sense given the heavily interstate nature of the ‘business of baseball’
today.”12

comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction
of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress . . .”).
8 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
9 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
10 See Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/800691/download (last visited Feb. 10, 2022) (explaining
the Antitrust Division's and Federal Trade Commission's antitrust enforcement powers).
11 Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208–09.
12 See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 7, at xi ("Scarcely anyone believes that baseball's exemption
makes any sense."); G. EDWARD WHITE, CREATING THE NATIONAL PASTIME 70 (1996)

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

In 1953, the modern version of baseball’s antitrust exemption was
officially established as a result of the Court’s decision in Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc.13 The Court in Toolson upheld the exemption, reasoning
that its abrogation was not of judicial concern, and was solely reserved for
Congress.14 Additionally, the Court in Toolson explicitly rejected the
opportunity to take another look at the underlying rationale and basis for
the decision in Federal Baseball—that baseball was not a form of interstate
commerce.15 Like Federal Baseball, Toolson has been excoriated by legal
scholars and judges.16 In fact, two justices issued a scathing dissent in
Toolson, notably pointing out that although unlikely, even if Justice
Holmes’ rationale was correct in Federal Baseball, there was no question
that it no longer made any sense over 30 years later.17
In 1972, the Supreme Court completed the “Baseball Trilogy” with their
decision in Flood v. Kuhn. In Flood, the Court finally admitted what had
undoubtedly been true for quite some time, specifically that “professional
baseball is a business, and it is engaged in interstate commerce.”18
However, despite this admission, the Court in Flood upheld baseball’s
antitrust exemption. Given the Court’s ruling in Flood, the legal exemption
for baseball’s antitrust exemption appears to be significantly weakened, if
(discussing Federal Baseball as "remarkably myopic, almost willfully ignorant of the
nature of the enterprise"); Kevin McDonald, Antitrust and Baseball: Stealing Holmes, 23 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 89, 90 (1998) ("The reaction of others ranged from thumping denouncement
... to gentle embarrassment on Holmes' behalf …").
13 Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356–57.
14 Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. “We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant
application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.” Id.
15 Id.
16 See e.g., Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir.
1970). Judge Friendly criticized the decisions in Federal Baseball and Toolson: “We freely
acknowledge our belief that Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice Holmes’ happiest
days [and] that the rationale of Toolson is extremely dubious.”
17 See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 362–65 (Burton, J., dissenting) (Justices Reed and Burton pointed
out the traveling between states, expenditures of large sums between states, and the
audience for baseball, which expanded beyond state lines with the help of radio and
television.)
18 Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
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not nonexistent.
II. BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN DANGER?
With the ruling in Flood the only factors keeping the exemption are stare
decisis and the fact that Congress, outside of the Curt Flood Act in 1998,
has yet to act with any legislation that would completely remove the
exemption.19 However, recently Congress has had two bills introduced
that would remove MLB's antitrust exemption by repealing Section 26(b)
of the Clayton Act.20 Both bills have been referred to their respective
Committee on the Judiciary, where they still sit at this point in time.21
Additionally, in NCAA v. Alston, dicta in the unanimous Supreme Court
decision seemingly provided an invitation for a challenge to be brought
against baseball’s antitrust exemption.22 In Alston, Justice Gorusch, writing
for the Court, referred to MLB’s antitrust exemption as “unrealistic,
inconsistent, and aberrational.”23 In the opinion, Justice Gorsuch also
seemingly invited legislators to address the problem with MLB’s antitrust
exemption but also that the Court may decide to abolish the judicially
created exemption if legislators chose not to address it.24
Whether it be Congressional action or a decision by the Supreme Court, it
seems that the MLB’s antitrust exemption is in serious danger. By taking
action, either Congress or the Supreme Court will be fixing a decision that
was wrong at the time and has been followed for nearly a century.
Edited by Alex Beezley

Id. at 282–83.
Competition in Professional Baseball Act, S. 1111, 117th Cong. (2021); Competition in
Professional Baseball Act, H.R. 2511, 117th Cong. (2021); 15 U.S.C. § 26(b).
21
H.R. 2511; S. 1111.
22 NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2159–2160 (2021).
23 Id. at 2159.
24 Id. at 2160.
19
20

